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Abstract
In the increasingly legitimized neo-liberal climate, state governments have
adopted policies that divest themselves o f formalized regulation. This move towards the
deregulation o f corporate policy has created a unique climate in which the responsibility
of minimizing risk and behaving in a responsible manner is left to market forces to
regulate. Corporations claim to have subsequently adopted self-mandated policies of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a means o f expressing their commitment to
moral concerns. The Case of Canadian oil producer EnCana illustrates that while the
admirable moral policy may exist, actual practice does not. EnCana’s negligent
environmental and social behaviour in Ecuador necessitate an examination of how an
unregulated doctrine o f corporate social responsibility can be used to harm the public
good. Its use of a corporate constitution not only as a public relations ploy to enhance its
reputation, but also as a smoke-screen to deter attention from the reality o f its practices,
raises serious questions regarding the validity o f a CSR doctrine. This article connects
theoretical discussions of neo-liberal policy and the rise of corporate social responsibility
to practical problems that plague the implementation o f such policies.
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Campaigns o f Corporate Social Producer EnCana Responsibility: The Case of
Canadian Oil
Neo-liberal policies have ushered in an era in which formalized state regulations
are replaced by a less intrusive form o f individual responsibilization where corporations
are governed at a distance (Dean, 2003; Rose, 1999). As a result, the industry-led
conceptualization o f corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often viewed by states,
corporations and consumers as a means o f rectifying the corporate acts o f irresponsibility
as well as perceived inefficiencies o f state regulations.
This article will clearly illustrate that despite CSR’s rising relevance within
corporate discourse, it fails to ensure corporate responsibility. While there has been a
willingness to adopt measures of corporate social responsibility, a major problem still
exists. This problem is the development o f CSR as a self-centred, public relations tool
that is focused more on image presentation than identifying a corporation’s social impact.
This problem present hurdles in demanding corporations behave in a responsible manner,
regardless o f location or whether they are formally recognized and publicly praised.
As a result corporations have been able to use an unregulated set of self-mandated
guidelines as a means o f deception. W ith no formalized doctrine or forum to enforce
CSR, it can be easily manipulated by the corporation for its own benefit rather than the
benefit o f the corporation’s stakeholders. Corporate social responsibility, therefore,
becomes another instrument of power placed in the hands of the corporation
The concept of CSR is not at all new. However, little research has been done on
its direct application, and the ideological climate and motivations that fostered its
increasing acceptance. Not much research has been conducted to assess whether socially
responsible corporate investment results from the introduction o f CSR policies or,
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alternatively, whether CSR policies are mostly unregulated guidelines subject to
manipulation. This article addresses this gap in the literature. First it will examine the
political and economic context behind the rise o f the discourse o f corporate social
responsibility. It will display the rise o f CSR policies as a means o f filling the role left
increasingly vacant as the shift towards neo-liberal policies have entrenched themselves
within state governments. Following the theoretical works o f Dean (2003) and Rose
(1999), this article will apply the neo-liberal concept o f shifting responsibilization to a
specific case to illustrate the shortcomings o f CSR policies and how they facilitate the
shift in the responsibility o f corporate behaviour from the state to the corporation and
consumers. Second, it will analyse a specific case study o f a Canadian company, Encana,
that prides itself on its CSR policies, yet continues to violate human rights and destroy
the environment in Ecuador.
The case o f Encana, a Canadian oil company operating in Ecuador provides clear
evidence that the discourse o f CSR fails to guarantee corporately responsible investment
when left unregulated. Based on an analysis of academic articles, articles posted on
various websites, newspaper and magazine articles and an interview with Toby Heaps o f
Corporate Knights Magazine, this article examines EnCana’s behaviour and use o f the
CSR policy.

Economic Restructuring and the Responsibilities o f Corporations and Citizens
The development of CSR within the past twenty-five years is related to changes in
the global political economy (Manokha, 2004: 56). The state has been radically
transformed through the processes o f neo-liberalism which include downsizing the role o f
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the state in a shift from a traditional central bureaucratic welfare state towards a form of
market-driven governance. It involves a transferring o f responsibility from state
regulating bodies to corporations and individuals themselves. This is not to say that the
state no longer exists, or that it is no longer a dominant figure among global power
structures, rather that its role is changing and that its influence is being eclipsed by other
forces.
The rise o f CSR can be attributed in large part to the changing dynamics of
government, in particular how states govern. The process o f neo-liberalism has created a
dramatic shift in the role of the state. It has caused a shrinking role o f the state in
regulating corporate activity and off-loaded that responsibility to corporations
themselves. Mitchell Dean (2003) identifies a process o f creating a responsible,
autonomous citizenry through a reconfiguration o f the welfare state under neo-liberalism
(179). In this sense the role of the government becomes more reflexive such that the state
is no longer responsible for the citizen from the cradle to the grave. Dean (2003) argues
that neo-liberal ideology offers a distinct type o f freedom that is tied to the market, which
is a rejection of the previous welfare regimes (179). In this sense the state is not
responsible for events of the market. Rather, individuals must adhere to a new
prudetialism such that they are now responsible for minimizing their own risks.
Individuals are no longer prudent as a means o f duty to the state; rather they must become
prudent in order to take care of themselves. The same can be said for corporations. No
longer is the state completely responsible to regulate the corporation, rather, the
corporation must now work to regulate its own risks as well as its impact on its
stakeholders. The role of the state therefore, is simply to ensure individual rights and the

3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

empowerment of the individual (Rose, 1999: 139). Rather than the state solving the
problems o f the citizenry and creating dependency, neo-liberal policies allow
governments to create new spaces where markets can be created and function. This shift
from passivity to activity creates a sense o f responsibility and self-actualization on the
part o f the individual (Rose, 1999: 145). Dean maintains that the shift towards neo
liberal policies is not the end of the social, rather that the social is “reconfigured within
constructed markets operating through agency and governed at a distance by technologies
o f performance” (Dean, 2003: 193). He introduces the term “responsible autonomy” as a
means o f defining indirect regulation (Dean, 2003: 196). Consequently traditional
bureaucracies o f the state are replaced with corporatized units based on competition.
This competition, it is argued, creates efficiency unattainable within a centralized
bureaucracy. Together with individual responsibilization, this corporatization o f state
bodies and the downsizing of the state’s role in regulating corporate activity have left
corporations in the position to operate with increased autonomy with minimal regulation
through indirect channels such as a doctrine o f corporate social responsibility. What had
been simply a concept of ethics has developed into a doctrine o f market-based regulation
with competition within an open market as a means o f regulating performance.
The traditional welfare state has been characterized as an inefficient, oppressive,
controlling central bureaucratic mechanism that has failed to reduce poverty and bring
about equality. Such criticism from both the political right and left have aided the
implementation of neo-liberal ideologies o f deregulation that gained strength during the
1970s, 80s, and 90s (Dean, 2003: 153).

The effects of deregulation o f corporate activity

have been unfolding in the past 25 years. Beginning in the 1970s, deregulation has
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affected the American banking, transportation, and telecommunication industries that
coincide with the rise o f neo-liberal policy in Western democracies (Horwitz, 1986).
Raines and Leathers (1995) as well as Daraio and Turchetti (2004) assess similar trends
towards deregulation pursued by Asian and European governments.
Historically, industry regulations have been seen as the hallmark o f the
interventionist state and a democratic victory o f the will o f the people to persevere in the
struggle against corporate interests (Trebing, 2004: 1). Conversely, critics of state
regulation see it as a hindrance to economic activity which in turn creates artificial cartels
o f dependency and “parasitic social welfare systems” which cause inefficiency and
corruption (Horwitz, 1986: 140). Horwitz identifies the process o f corrupting regulatory
bureaucracies such that they have been taken over by the very interests they are trying to
regulate. He likens this process to neo-Marxist capture theory which states that a
revolving door regulatory system made popular in Japan places industry elites in
regulatory agencies and vice versa such that regulatory bodies have become corrupted
and sterile (Horwitz, 1986: 140; Richter, 2001: 19). Structural Marxists have argued that
regulatory agencies respond only at the request o f industry to maintain market order.
Coming from a dramatically different perspective, the Chicago School o f free-market
economics similarly argues that industry regulation more often than not creates exclusive
cartels. Unlike the Structural Marxists that call for a purification and democratization of
regulatory agencies, free-market economists call for a dismantling of the entire process
with control put into the hands of the market (Horwitz, 1986: 141). Finding criticism
from both the political left and right, the case for state regulation has become increasingly

5
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difficult to make within a climate o f increasing legitimization o f neo-liberal policy in
state legislation.
Perceived bureaucratic inefficiencies have been blamed on regulatory regimes
which are said to have led to stagnation within industry (Trebing, 2004: 2). As various
American industries were losing ground to foreign competitors, deregulation was seen as
the only means o f maintaining American corporate hegemony. The same rationale was
employed in Japan to maintain the supremacy o f its financial markets under increasing
pressure from global competition (Raines and Leathers, 1995: 362). Weeks argues that
less regulation and freer trade is imperative in establishing a country’s competitive
advantage (Weeks, 1999: 49). Therefore, it was a perceived complacency o f the
corporations that initiated and legitimized this form o f deregulation within the political
and civil realm (Horwitz, 1986: 147). Likewise, pressure from organizations such as the
W orld Bank encouraged an end to economic trade regulation in several emerging areas
such as Latin American markets (Weeks, 1999: 50).
While existing literature has provided a detailed analysis o f the factors that
motivated states to pursue policies o f deregulation, as well as literature that has been
critical of deregulation’s impact, very little research has illuminated the connection
between these policies and the rise o f CSR. This paper provides clear evidence that the
move towards neo-liberal policies empower corporations to manipulate public trust while
professing to do the contrary through policies o f CSR.
A broad-based acceptance o f deregulation and its motivating force o f neo-liberal
policy have brought into question many of the securities previously taken for granted
under the values o f the welfare state. It has opened the door to an increasing shift away

6
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from the state as the traditional benefactor and regulator o f the interests of civil society to
an emphasis on corporate self-governance.

The Rise o f Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility renders itself open to various interpretations. In
essence, the concept refers simply to a set o f standards or ethics that extends the
definition o f stakeholder beyond financial shareholders to all individuals, as well as the
physical environment, affected by the corporation’s actions. This is based on the notion
that corporations are not simply responsible to make a profit, but to ensure that its effect
on individuals and communities is positive and sustainable. This mentality is in part
derived from neo-liberal doctrine o f individual responsibility. Since the state is
increasingly less involved in regulating corporate activities, CSR is seen as a means of
filling the void left in the wake of a dismantled welfare state. Shifting responsibility
away from state governments places consumers in the position previously held by state
regulating bodies. Market-based regulation, it is argued, empowers consumers to hold
corporations accountable for their behaviour such that regulating authority is not derived
from the state, but from consumer preference and action. (Ruggie, 2004: 510-514;
Cashore, 2002: 504)
Jackson and Nelson (2004) argue that the development o f corporate social
responsibility has been mandated by two prevailing developments of the developed
world: the crisis of inequality and the crisis of trust. The development o f information
technology has made it infinitely easier to share data in shorter amounts of time and
across greater distances. This has ushered in widespread awareness o f social inequalities
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both domestically and internationally (Jackson and Nelson, 2004: 21). Recent domestic
trends o f increasing wage gaps, decreasing net worth and real wages for the lower
percentiles of the population become even more potent in the light o f exponential
increases in executive pay and corporate profits. Such trends are responsible for igniting
the crisis on inequality. These domestic realities coupled with the growing awareness o f
corporate activity in foreign locations have resulted in widespread social action such as
the boycott o f Nestle products in the 1980s and the campaign against Nike in the mid
1990s that can have a damaging impact on economic performance.
The crisis o f trust can also be very damaging to a corporation’s economic
performance. Fortune magazine’s editorial director Geoffrey Colvin (2002) states that “a
company’s trustworthiness, embodied in brand and reputation, is increasingly all
customers, employees, and investors have to rely o n .. .Experience shows that this asset is
built slowly and painfully but can be lost in the blink o f an eye, and in losing it, you may
lose everything” (April 29, 2002). Trust and confidence are vital to the economics of a
free-market system. Losing that confidence can lead to dramatic collapse. Never was
this more apparent than during 2000-2003 when highly publicized corporate implosions
of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Arthur Andersen cost employees, customers, and
pensions plans billions of dollars.

Fear o f losing the trust o f consumers and/or investors

may have pushed corporations to formulate new policies of corporate social
responsibility.
In addition, as Henderson (2001) points out, CSR is propelled in large part by
public concern with environmental issues such as global warming and de-forestation.
Furthermore, he argues that hostility towards rising corporate profit placed corporate

8
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giants in the spotlight. Such criticisms are facilitated by advancements in communication
technology that have given NGOs greater influence and reach in organizing anti
corporate campaigns (29, 30).
The increasing inclusion of CSR within corporate policy is a clear indication of
the need corporate decision makers see for presenting a positive social image to
consumers. The two most obvious areas o f corporate presentation are through annual
reports and company websites. As an economic organization a corporation produces
annual financial reports. This has been unchanging since the conception o f public
shareholding. The most dramatic recent trend in reporting has been the development of
sustainability reporting that accompany annual financial reports. Sustainability reports
provide more than simply economic details, but address environmental concerns,
philanthropic giving, issues o f corporate governance, and a variety o f other social issues
that are directed at an audience beyond shareholders. The quantity of sustainability
reports has increased substantially throughout the 1990s (Joseph, 2002: 97). In 2003 the
Global Reporting Initiative claimed that over 2500 corporations provide environmental or
sustainability reports (Neef, 2003: 206).
Corporate websites have also become a popular tool in promoting a corporation’s
views and commitments to CSR. While websites themselves were virtually non-existent
in the 1980s, by 1998 a sample of Fortune 500 companies displayed that the vast majority
of corporations had website and 82% were using the website as a means o f promoting the
firm’s social responsibility (Esrock and Leichty, 1998: 311). The use o f a website can
provide a variety o f benefits for a corporation. A website can be an active tool in
organizational self-presentation that “allow corporations to set public policy agendas”

9
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(Esrock and Leichty, 1998: 306). Most importantly it allows corporations the ability to
set their own agenda by avoiding media gatekeepers (Esrock and Leichty, 1998: 306). It
allows corporations to present as fact exactly what they want to say to the largest possible
audience.
Recognizing the state’s declining role in corporate governance, a corporation’s
move towards CSR becomes a response to the expectations o f activists within civil
society as well as the state. Beginning as an expectation that a corporation would obey
the laws o f capitalism and the laws o f the state, the concept o f CSR has moved beyond
the ethics o f economic operation to expect corporations to be innovative and go beyond
what is required by law, and respond to social norms o f philanthropy and charitable
giving (Carroll, 1999: 283). This included the development o f stakeholder theory that
identified the stakeholders of a corporation as more than just the employees and the
shareholders, but also the suppliers, customers, local communities and all those
connected to and affected by the operations o f the corporation.
State governments are increasingly pushing the doctrine o f CSR as a means of
indirectly regulating corporate behaviour at a distance. In 2001 the member governments
at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City initiated the first Hemisphere-wide
conference on CSR. This indicates a growing acceptance of CSR as a new wave of
corporate self-regulation (“Americas Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility
Promotes Alliances for Sustainable Development o f Latin America and Caribbean.”
w w w .iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/2002/cp21202e.htm). The US Department of State openly
endorses CSR guidelines as “a set o f non-binding recommendations from governments to
corporations” which are intended to “help companies operate in harmony with
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government policies and communities.” The Department professes its desire to form
voluntary partnerships with corporations, which it believes is the most effective means o f
producing sustainable results (Craner, 2002). This dramatically displays the effect of
neo-liberal policy on state government initiatives.

CSR and Its Critics: Past and Present
While corporations seem to be accepting notions o f social responsibility in large
numbers, CSR itself has been open to a great deal o f criticism. More commonly
criticized for not being sufficiently regulated or being a weak and voluntary policy, CSR
is also receiving a renaissance of criticism on economic grounds that echo Milton
Friedman’s thoughts of the 1970s that “the only responsibility o f business is to make a
profit” (Roberts, 2003: 255). Henderson argues that CSR provides a greater burden on all
levels o f management that has not proven to help either business or society (Henderson,
2001: 59). The International Chamber o f Commerce argued that a mandatory code o f
conduct “would put the clock back to a bygone era” (Richter, 2001: 15). Henderson
(2001) argues that CSR is a “misguided virtue” propagated as “part o f the mythology o f
global salvationism” (147) which is rooted in a “Salvationist coalition” that presents a
distorted view o f the impacts of globalization” (83).
On the opposing side of the spectrum CSR can be criticized as a tool that has been
captured by corporations to serve their own needs o f public relations and identity
presentation. Likewise, it can be argued that the policies of CSR do not go far enough,
and that its ambiguity renders it useless. The criticism surrounding the concept’s
ambiguity can be seen through three main concerns. First there is the problem of
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definition. Criticism arises from the fact that there is no clear universal definition of
CSR. While various academics and corporations alike dating back over fifty years have
attempted to define the term and all that it encompasses, there still remains no consensus
or solid operational definition nor is there a clear conceptual understanding of what
exactly should be classified as the social good (Roberts, 2003: 250; Esrock and Leichty,
1998: 307; Henderson, 2001: 49). The second major problem surrounds CSR’s
application. CSR is a voluntary policy. It is not mandated by any organization or
government and is up to the corporation to apply it however is seen fit. There is no real
right or wrong application and no necessity to apply it if the corporation does not see its
values lining up with those o f CSR (Neef, 2003: 113; Joseph, 2002: 96; Richter, 2001:
77). The final criticism is that of verification. Since the number o f sustainability reports
has continually increased, there remains a great deal o f question surrounding the validity
of environmental and social claims made by a specific corporation. Will a corporation
accurately report its own faults and shortcomings? Many sustainability reports are not
audited by an independent third party to verify the claims a company makes (Joseph,
2002: 98).
As mentioned earlier, in the 1970s and 80s supporters of the regulatory capture
theory feared that industry leaders occupied positions on state regulatory boards
(Horwitz, 1986: 140; Richter, 2001: 19). Similar fears prompt current criticism o f CSR
as being captured by corporations and used to further their own purposes. A major
problem for anti-corporate activists during the Nestle infant formula boycott o f the 1970s
and 1980s was when corporations and regulating bodies came together to negotiate on the
contents of an industry code of conduct. The controversy over the marketing o f infant
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formula included a dispute between the industry and the WHO and United Nations. The
industry fought to avoid the implementation o f a code o f conduct that would guide its
marketing practices. Intense negotiation resulted in a watered down, weakly worded
document that the industry could use to legitimize its actions (Richter, 2001: 62). While
Nestle, the industry’s largest producer, worked the hardest to block any form of
regulation, it simultaneously established its own office of corporate responsibility in
1977. This may seem to be a contradiction. However, when CSR is understood as an
image enhancement, the reasons surrounding the move o f corporate policy towards
(apparent) acceptance of a CSR doctrine becomes clearer (Richter, 2001: 54).
In light of these criticisms, it is necessary to explore specific empirical examples
of the application o f CSR policies to assess the degree to which it might be a genuine
attempt to operate responsibly rather than a public relations ploy. The rest o f the paper
will focus on the case o f Encana, a Canadian oil company, and its operations in Ecuador.
It will illustrate the contradiction between its stated commitment to socially responsible
investment and its actual performance.

The Case o f EnCana
The story o f EnCana dates back over one hundred years. While the company in
its present form was only created in 2002 by the merger of PanCanadian Energy and the
Alberta Energy Company, the company’s roots begin in state-mandated initiatives. In
1881 the Canadian government granted the Canadian Pacific Railway twenty five million
acres o f land as part o f a deal to build a transcontinental railway. Such land was most
certainly not vacant, but part of a traditional aboriginal hunting and trapping grounds. In
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1883 CP workers discovered natural gas while drilling for a well outside Medicine Hat,
Alberta. In 1958 CP created the Canadian Pacific Oil and Gas Company to manage its
mineral rights holdings. Merging with Central Del Rio Oil in 1971, the PanCanadian
Energy Company was created. By 1975 the government o f Alberta had decided to
establish a public energy corporation in which it would hold a 50% stake “to provide
Albertans and other Canadians with an opportunity to participate, through share
ownership, in the industrial and energy-related growth o f Alberta” (www.encana.ca/
whoweare/history/index.html). A steady divestment o f shares by the government resulted
in the government selling its remaining shares in the company by 1993, making it a
completely publicly traded company.
In 1999, the Alberta energy company purchased Pacalta Resources and its
operations in Ecuador. The future growth o f Ecuador’s oil industry was limited by the
existing SOTE pipeline built by the government in 1975 that was operating at capacity.
Alberta Energy, which became EnCana, became the primary stakeholder (36.3%) o f a
consortium that negotiated a deal to develop a new pipeline from the Amazonian interior
to the Pacific coast for export. The Oleoductos Crudos Pesados (OCP) consortium
pipeline would cross over 500 km, cost over $1.1 billion US and allow EnCana to
increase production from 51 000 barrels per day to over 90 000 barrels per day
(McCleam, 2003).
While the presence o f a major international oil corporation operating in an
undeveloped country such as Ecuador is bound to face pockets of resistance from
affected local populations, the level of hostility and the international campaign mounted
against the company have surprised both observers and management. What is
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particularly troubling about EnCana’s involvement in Ecuador is not simply its blatant
disregard for the environmental and social well being o f Ecuador and its residents, but its
persistence that its widely publicized corporate constitution is industry leading, and
guides all of its dealings and operations as an “inner compass” (www.encana.ca/pdfs/
responsibility/English_Constitution.pdf). EnCana claims that wherever it operates, it
demands that everything it does is held to the same high standard. However, the
construction of the OCP pipeline has forced many o f EnCana’s claims into the spotlight.
An examination o f EnCana’s corporate constitution reveals many noble ideas that
greatly exceed the traditional corporate commitment to economic value creation. It offers
a moral connection between its business practices and its economic expectations:
To excel, to achieve our goals, we must have a shared set o f moral
principles - an inner compass - that guides our behaviour, and we
must have business principles that clearly show the path we will
travel. We need to define what we should expect o f ourselves and
what we can expect of each other. (Corporate Constitution: 9, www.encana.ca/
/pdfs/responsibility/English_Constitution.pdf)
The Constitution makes very bold claims about how the corporation will conduct itself
and how its success is to be measured,
We function on the basis of trust, integrity, and respect. We are
committed to benchmark practices in safety and environmental
stewardship, ethical business conduct, and community responsibility.
Our success is measured through both our behaviour and our bottom
line. (11)
It states that EnCana will not tolerate unlawful or unethical behaviour, intimidation or
harassment, environmental, health or safety negligence, or workplace discrimination and
deceptive communication (24).
If one is to truly accept EnCana’s claim that all of its operations are subject to the
same set o f standards world-wide, it may seem incredibly difficult to comprehend why
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such outrage has resulted from practices o f the above mentioned calibre. The obvious
answer is that there must exist a contradiction between the corporate policies published
and the real-time procedures taking place in Ecuador.
The majority o f the problems EnCana has faced in Ecuador surround the OCP
pipeline. The development of such a large-scale infrastructural endeavour delivered a
great deal o f publicity that was initially welcomed by the company. The Ecuadorian
environmental protection group, Accion Ecologica, has been one o f the most vocal
organizations combating EnCana’s endeavours from within Ecuador. It has been very
critical of EnCana’s environmental practices o f drill sites as well as the procedures and
route chosen in the construction of the OCP pipeline. Much o f the criticism stems from
the fact that EnCana is operating in one o f the richest biologically diverse areas of the
globe: the Amazonian rainforest. Major practical violations have been reported that lead
to severe health affects. Accion Ecologica has reported direct dumping o f wastewaters
into fresh water rivers. It has conducted tests o f drinking water near drill sites that show
unacceptable levels o f contamination (“EnCana.” www.torontoenvironment.org/ecuador/
Canadian.Htm#encana). Matthew McCleam o f Canadian Business magazine documents
widespread criticism of local farmers whose farms near sites o f production have become
barren and whose irrigation streams have become filthy and unusable as a result of
pipeline construction (2003).
While EnCana is directly and knowingly contaminating water sources, critics
have been equally outraged by the potential ecological disasters that could occur at one o f
many points along the pipeline’s route. The OCP pipeline crosses eleven
environmentally protected areas, ninety-four seismic fault lines, and passes six active
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volcanoes (Clerk, 2004). On March 1, 2003 sixty barrels o f oil spilled from a pumping
station along the pipeline during an initial test. Reports were confirmed by OCP
representative who later estimated an operational spill could spew roughly 3050 barrels
before being controlled (“Environmental Irresponsibility, Corruption and Human Rights
Abuse: Canada’s EnCana Corporation’s Contribution to Ecuadorian Development.”
www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/canada%20ethical.htm). Oil spills along the existing
SOTE pipeline were common, with six in the late 1980s alone (MacCleam, 2003). While
critics fear the expansive pipelines susceptibility to landslides and other seismic activity
could be disastrous to the ecologically sensitive areas through which it passes, EnCana’s
officials have maintained that the construction o f the pipeline was engineered to
withstand a variety o f potential problems. Heaps (personal interview, November 9, 2004)
recalls a photograph he took of the pipeline while under construction that had been
contorted and mangled from a recent landslide. Tales o f construction shortcuts and
questionable practices prevail in local communities surrounding the pipeline. Nadja
Drost’s film footage displays a section o f the pipeline that is supposed to be 1.5 m below
ground level that is clearly visible through a thin layer o f soil (Drost and Merino, 2004).
EnCana has always claimed that the processes leading to the conception and
construction of the OCP pipeline have followed W orld Bank guidelines demanded by the
majority lender for the project: Germany’s WestLB Bank (MacCleam, 2003). However,
Robert Goodland, former ecologist for the World Bank, reviewed the OCP environmental
impact report and concluded that the OCP had determined the pipeline route long before
the assessment was complete and that it lacked consultation with the people it affected.
The pipeline route also violated the natural habitats policy because it crossed protected
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environmental reserves. OCP’s proposal also violates the involuntary relocation policy
o f the World Bank which requires relocation plans and adequate compensation which the
OCP did not include (MacCleam, 2003). The OCP rejected all allegations o f wrong
doing, claiming that Mr. Goodland was given misleading information.
Perhaps the most alarming events coming from Ecuador are not simply the
environmental disregard shown by EnCana and its subsidiaries, but particularly the
accusations o f blatant human rights violations. The actions o f EnCana and the OCP have
sparked protests across the country (MacCleam, 2003). Organized protests surrounding
the pipeline’s route through the protected Mindo Cloudforest Reserve were met with tear
gas and arrest of several protesters (“Residents and Environmentalists Paralyze OCP
Pipeline Construction in Mindo.” www.amazonwatch.org/_newsroom/ view_news.php?
id=491; Nelson, 2002). In a similar ten day protest scuffles between security forces and
protesters left two civilians dead and five wounded (Jermyn and Shirley, 2002, Heaps,
“Tightrope Act.” www.corporateknights.ca /stories/ecuador.asp).
The acquisition of land from private landowners for the 500 km pipeline was
perhaps one o f the OCP’s greatest challenges that have led to the greatest degree of
public outrage. In the Ecuadorean Amazon, subsistence farming is the main economic
activity for local dwellers. And consequently, loss of land results in a loss o f livelihood
for them. Yet this did not seem to deter EnCana and the OCP from going ahead with their
plan and expropriating the land they required. Local residents complain o f aggression
and intimidation. The OCP hired security forces to forcibly coerce people to sell their
land. Over two hundred landowners lodged complaints that the OCP did not pay them
for their land, or paid less than the agreed amount. Other complaints included brutality
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against women and children (Heaps, “Tightrope A ct”). W hen the Ecuadorian Congress
was commissioned to form a hearing for residents to voice their concerns, several
hundred residents along the pipeline route complained o f police brutality, intimidation,
and the use of tear gas to force people from occupied homes (“Environmental
Irresponsibility...” www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/canada% 20ethical.htm). Authorities
have continually denied responsibility for police and security force actions arguing that
they are under the paid control of the OCP and are therefore not the responsibility of the
state (“Environmental Irresponsibility...” www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/canada%
20ethical.htm; Heaps, “Tightrope Act.”).
Toby Heaps recalled a level o f outrage among the local population that he had
never before witnessed. This outrage was coupled together with an equally fervent denial
on the part o f EnCana of any wrongdoing. His visit to Ecuador brought a noticeable
antagonism from the local population simply due to the association with EnCana as a
Canadian corporation. He recalls that “the people at EnCana are just completely
willingly, knowingly, or mischievously oblivious to it” (Heaps, personal interview,
November 9, 2004). As an editor o f a business magazine, Heaps professed a desire to
determine a clear and unbiased analysis o f the situation in Ecuador. He concedes the
validity of the “Golden Goose” phenomenon. This is the desire of a local population
brandishing unfounded claims against a multinational corporation in hopes of windfall
community development in return for community cooperation. However, in the
Ecuadorian situation, Heaps witnessed blatant disregard for the well being o f local
populations, and a deep-rooted widespread outrage for the severity of the situation. He
states, “I tried to find someone that was happy about it [the pipeline]. I talked to
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hundreds o f people along where it was being built, everyone was pissed” (Heaps,
personal interview, November 9, 2004).
EnCana has repeatedly answered the criticisms lobbied against it by claiming that
its involvement in Ecuador is for the benefit o f the entire nation; that the taxes, royalties,
and jobs they supply are in dire need in a country as underdeveloped as Ecuador. They
also argue that they go the extra mile by providing community programs that benefit the
neglected regions of the nation. The NanPaz foundation was set up by EnCana as a
community development centre but has itself faced serious allegations o f creating
division in the community. Activists allege that EnCana has used the foundation to buy
off community leaders with jobs as a means o f controlling public sentiment
(“Environmental Irresponsibility...” w w w .rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/Canada%20ethical.
htm). MacCleam (2003) identifies the attitudes o f critics who see the “OCP’s community
relations efforts as thinly veiled ploys to buy consent.” The cries o f the local Ecuadorian
public were being heard with increasing clarity at the international level. International
NGOs such as Greenpeace Canada, the Toronto Environmental Alliance, the David
Suzuki Foundation, Global Aware, and the Sierra Club all called on EnCana to pull out of
OCP. A variety o f different NGOs organized the Sassenberg Summit in Germany to
strategize intensified pressure on home countries o f OCP members (“International
Alliance Vows to Intensify Opposition in Eight Countries to Ecuador’s OCP Oil
Pipeline.” www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=493).
Protests of the German lending bank WestLB have resulted in parliamentary
hearings investigating the matter. While unsuccessful in persuading the bank to
withdraw its funding from the project, the collaborative efforts of making those involved
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aware have not fallen on completely deaf ears. Michael Jantzi Research Associates, a
firm advising clients on socially responsible investment considers EnCana ineligible for
socially responsible portfolios because o f its involvement in the OCP (MacCleam, 2003).
Likewise, the social unrest has delivered an instability that has affected the OCP’s credit
rating. Moody’s Investor’s Service downgraded their rating o f the OCP to near junk
status (MacCleam, 2003). However, these criticisms and concerns have done little to
change EnCana’s behaviour.
These allegations are only magnified by the insistence by EnCana that all o f its
operations meet the requirements laid out in its own corporate constitution. Such
insistence conflicts with the reality o f EnCana’s behaviour in Ecuador. EnCana’s
response is that the criticisms regarding its Ecuadorian operations are grossly
exaggerated. It could also be argued that the majority o f the problems were a result o f the
OCP. Therefore, EnCana may not have been aware o f the reality of the situation.
However, EnCana is the largest stakeholder in the consortium with 36.3%. This makes it
fairly unlikely that the company would hold such a large stake of a major development
project (on which the future o f its Ecuadorian operations depended) in any sort o f handsoff approach. This is in fact evident by the appointment of Andrew Patterson, EnCana’s
C hief Financial Officer (CFO) as the president of the OCP. This allowed EnCana direct
influence and knowledge of OCP’s actions but also strengthens its responsibility for
whatever the OCP and its contractors do.
The question that needs to be asked is: if EnCana was “knowingly, willingly, or
mischievously” aware of the problems it and the OCP were causing, what is the purpose
o f having and flaunting a corporate constitution? The answer to this question is directly
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related to the benefits provided by such a constitution. While there is an increasing
amount of research pointing to the direct benefits o f having a corporate code of conduct
(Jackson and Nelson, 2004; Neef, 2003; Schwartz and Gibb, 1999) as well as evidence
supporting consumer and employee expectation o f ethical behaviour (Joseph, 2002; Mohr
and Webb, 2001; Ryan, 1986), the most convincing need for the development o f a
corporate code o f ethics comes from events o f crisis. Examples o f Nestle, Nike, Shell,
Texico, Johnson & Johnson, etc. clearly demonstrate episodes that necessitate the
development of a code, as well as evidence to respective competitors o f the same. The
development of a code provides a corporation a licence to operate (Heaps and Rea, “Four
Companies and a Code.” www.corporateknights.ca/stories/colombia.asp). It legitimizes
their operations and provides it a concrete document to fall back when its behaviour
comes under attack. When confronted about its operations in Ecuador, EnCana’s first
response always goes back to its corporate constitution as though no company with such
high standards could possibly do anything wrong.
The case of EnCana clearly displays its desire to provide a favourable image of
itself, particularly because o f its role in a high-risk industry such as petroleum extraction.
The importance of corporate image is magnified within politically active and investorrich nations. For both o f these reasons, EnCana would have added incentive to develop
and abide by its code of ethics in such nations. As a result, EnCana regularly receives
praise for its high social standards when working in Canada and has received awards for
its behaviour (MacCleam, 2003; Sheremata, 2003). When its actions are visible to a
public that has the power of investment and democratic influence over state governments,
EnCana seems to behave well. Likewise, when there is an increasing portion of the
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population involving themselves in criteria-based social investing, and when one o f
EnCana’s top seven institutional investors is Ethical Funds (“EnCana.”
www.torontoenvironment.org/ecuador/canadian.Htm#encana), EnCana seems to take its
corporate constitution more seriously. However, when outside o f those arenas in remote
locations beyond the moral proximity o f investors and consumers, EnCana’s behaviour
begins to look remarkably different.
Processes of neo-liberalism and the deregulation o f the international move of
capital have provided major corporations effective tools to enlarge their sphere of
influence in the void created by a shrinking state. Ecuador in particular has fallen victim
to circumstances o f insurmountable debt that have left the nation at the mercy o f
international oil corporations and the revenues they produce. Corporate capital is
subsequently elevated into a powerful position in which it can easily exploit foreign
markets for its own gain. EnCana is no exception.
As a result, EnCana has been able to maximize its profits. 2004 sales growth
targets rose from 10% to 15% by mid 2004 (“EnCana raises sales targets.”
www.cbcnews.ca) with quarterly profits that topped $1 billion for both the first and
second quarters of 2004 (Jang, 2004). However, despite EnCana’s ability to generate
incredible wealth from its foreign operations in Ecuador, its moral obligations outlined in
its corporate constitution get lost. Its global expansion and overwhelming profits have
not been met with the same expansion o f EnCana’s moral conscience. The reality of
EnCana’s behaviour in Ecuador displays how easy and viable it can be for a corporation
to constantly propagate a constitution o f responsibility and ethics yet still operate
horrendously contrary to its own published values of CSR. This evidence demonstrates
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how dangerous problems that can persist despite constructive moves towards a discourse
o f CSR. While this in no way justifies the action o f EnCana, it does provide insight as to
how and why this contradiction between word and deed could occur.

Conclusion
The moral shift o f increased social, consumer, and investor activism of the past
decade may indeed be having a positive affect on the developm ent o f campaigns o f CSR.
However, the notions o f self-government and individual responsibilization which inhabit
neo-liberal policies find a way of negating a positive affect and turning it into an
additional tool o f enterprise. The increasing void of formalized regulatory supervision
has created a climate ripe for a self-serving, imaged based doctrine o f CSR. EnCana has
taken full advantage o f an opportunity to exploit not only a foreign nation desperately in
need o f the tax revenues it provides, but it is also guilty o f exploiting the moral
conscience o f the North American population. EnCana’s propagation o f an industry
leading corporate constitution can be thought o f little more than wishful thinking when
observed in the light of its ongoing behaviour. When the corporate benefit of a code of
CSR is understood, it is difficult to see EnCana’s constitution as anything other than a
public relations tool. This is particularly a powerful tool in the oil extractive industry that
is so heavily dependent on large-scale new investment for the replacement of production
sites. A CSR code in this industry can act to convincing both risk-minded and sociallyminded investors who would rather stay clear of a volatile and potentially damaging
industry such as resource extraction.
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The problem for EnCana in Ecuador is that the same technologies that have
aided the transfer o f capital and corporate information between remote locations allowing
EnCana to operate easily all over the world have also allowed civil unrest in those remote
locations to become widely publicized world-wide. The result has been a movement of
solidarity spanning the globe working to aid the plight o f the Ecuadorian population and
demand responsible action from EnCana.
This article provides a clear example how adopting policies o f neo-liberalism can
have very real and damaging effects. It applies theory to practice to illustrate the
tremendous impact o f pursuing a shift from formalized state regulation to individual
responsibilization. Identifying the negative potential o f CSR to transfer increasing power
into corporate hands, this study provides a sobering view o f the dangers that follow the
pursuit of new policies that have not yet been clearly defined or sufficiently debated.
Campaigns o f corporate social responsibility have the potential to powerfully
redefine the manner in which business is done and the subsequent affects thereof.
Elowever, as this article illustrates, CSR can fall victim to various forces which shift and
contort the ideals of the doctrine into a tool o f publicity for the corporation rather than a
genuine concern of its stakeholders. This article displays how easily this can occur.
W hether or not CSR is motivated by valour intentions, the reality o f this situation clearly
illustrates how dangerous neo-liberal policies o f unregulated, self-mandated guidelines
can be. Placing increasing power in the hands o f corporations such as EnCana clearly
demonstrates how easily a well-intending doctrine o f CSR can be easily manipulated to
suit the demands and desires of its corporate propagators. Even when openly disclosed,
accusations o f a corporation’s malpractice encounter ignorance and denial from those
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responsible. When asked to comment on the concerns raised in this article, EnCana
denied an interview and said that questions regarding how it conducts its operations could
be found in its corporate constitution published on its website. Such an unfortunate
response clearly indicates the dangers o f self-government and relaxed regulatory
procedures in the operations o f corporations such as EnCana.
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